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Abstract. Visual cryptography depends on two shares. The initial configuration,
extra security bits and the number of the rule for the CA along with the number of
computed steps serve as a password for a visually encrypted image. The second
share could contain a predefined pattern; the developed algorithm uses a snapshot of a CA after a certain number of steps to generate the predefined share.
Only one of these shares has to be random. The developed encryption system is a
hybrid between visual and classical cryptographic approaches. It requires less
storage space compared to a standalone visual encryption system and relies on
Rule 30’s tested statistically significant randomness.
Keywords: Cellular Automata, CA Rule 30, Cryptography, One Time Pad,
Visual Cryptography.

1

Introduction

Visual cryptography [1-2] is broad in definition and applicability [3-23], and there are
many methods used in encrypting visual data. In essence, an image is converted into
one or more images, which in isolation convey no information whatsoever. However,
with a proper means to decrypt those images, one can display the original data.
During Eurocrypt ’94, Moni Naor and Adi Shamir [1] proposed a novel visual
cryptographic method. Their method was based on the one time pad system of encryption. In its most basic form an image is split into two derived images or ‘shares.’
One share acts as a key and the other as a cipher. Each one, when viewed in isolation
from the other, displays no meaningful data. However, when they are superimposed a
discernible image can be viewed.
The advantage of their method lies in its security and practicality. It is completely
secure due to the fact that without all the shares the original visual data cannot be
retrieved. Also, the encrypted shares are generated in a random manner to ensure that
no date can be retrieved from a single share. Its practicality on the other hand lies in
computational decryption. Printing the shares on transparencies and superimposing
them on top of one another will achieve the desired decryption.
Y.Q. Shi (Ed.): Transactions on DHMS IX, LNCS 8363, pp. 57–67, 2014.
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ually builds the first share in a completely random fashiion.
Visual cryptography usu
Then, using the original im
mage’s pixel data as well as the first share’s random piixel
data, the second complemen
ntary share is generated.
Despite the method’s sim
mplicity and practicality, the retrieval and decryption off the
image requires presence of both shares. If one of the shares is missing, the decrypttion
process becomes impossiblle. In addition, a single image of size n bytes has to be expanded, first by doubling eaach side and then by multiplying that by two.
If we can find a method that can deterministically generate a share based on a relatively small password, we can
c bypass the need for having two shares altogether. O
Our
study proposes that Cellularr Automata (CA) rules can be used to grow a share basedd on
a predetermined start state. A cellular automaton can be very easily represented iin a
visual way as a bi-dimensio
onal square grid, or composed by lines of cells. Each cell is
either black or white, and in
n every subsequent step (or line), there is an applied rule tthat
dictates which color that sp
pecific cell will be, based on the previous state color andd its
immediate neighbors. See Fig. 1 as an example of a cellular automaton.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Fig. 1. Grid showing an examp
ple of a cellular automaton rule. The rule makes a particular cell
white if either of its neighbors are white (c) on the step before, and makes the cell black if bothh its
neighbors were black (a, d) or black and white (b, e).

Differentiating from otherr works in security using CA [2, 24-31], our approach utiliizes
CA to address Visual Crypttography’s issues, with the aid of Rule 30, by only requirring
one share to be stored. By do
oing so it helps reduce the overall size of the encrypted im
mage
and preserve the ability to reestore the original image with only one share.
Despite the abundance off computational capabilities, timing brute force attacks [[32]
could become an intensivee computational task, increasing the time and processsing
exponentially, unlike conteext-free grammar passwords [33] and the use of passw
word
dictionaries [34-36]. Man
ny times, the strength of written western alphanumeeric
passwords [37] is related to
o personal information such as common names and standdard
file names in Unix [38]. Additionally,
A
employment of social engineering techniqques
can give attackers informatiion about user passwords [39].

2

Approach

2.1

Original Visual Enccryption Method

The original encryption meethod is derived from the one time pad visual encrypttion
system proposed by Naor an
nd Shamir at Eurocrypt ’94. Its most basic form, a black and
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Fig. 2. This shows thee generation of two encrypted shares from a single image

white image, is split into tw
wo shares (S1 and S2). Both S1 and S2 will have twice the
length and width of the orig
ginal image (see Fig.2).
Therefore, a single pixel in the original image is split into a set of four pixels. Any seet of
four pixels derived from the original pixel will alternate in color: black-white-white-bllack
( Fig. 3-a).
or white-black-black-white (see
The specific order of thee pixels in each four-pixel set in S1 is generated random
mly.
The order in the complemeentary share, ‘S2’, however, is not random. S2 is generaated
based on the original pixel in
i the original image as well as the color and order of pixxels
in S1 (see Fig. 3-b).
If the original pixel is black,
b
the two complementary pixels, when superimpossed,
should produce four subseq
quent black pixels (see Fig. 3-c). If, on the other hand, the
original pixel is white, thee superimposed pixels should still alternate producinng a
pseudo-grey color resulting
g from the alternating black and white pixels.
As a result, it is clear thatt this method is completely secure since the share is initiaally
randomly generated. There is no way to tell whether a set of four pixels in an encryppted
share is derived from a blacck or white pixel by just looking at one share. Fig. 3 suummarizes the visual encoding
g process.
2.2

Cellular Automata

A Cellular Automaton is a discrete model that represents a number of parallel entiities
that interact with one anotheer in a way that influences their evolution and developm
ment.
Simply put, a binary Cellulaar Automaton can be represented by an n-dimensional arrray
where each member (i.e. celll) is an entity. Each entity normally has one of two statees, 1
or 0. The state that a cell asssumes in a given iteration is dependent on a set of rules tthat
govern how a cell evolves from
f
one iteration to the next in accordance with the ceell’s
state and its neighbors’ statees.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 3. (a) Possible sets of 4 pixels generated in share 1 and share 2 from encrypting a whitte or
black pixel. (b) Two possible sets of 4 pixels generated in share 1 and share 2 from encryptinng a
uperimposing corresponding sets of 4 pixels.
black pixel. (c) The result of su

This field of computatio
onal sciences dates back to the mid 1900s where it was the
interests of the likes of Staanislaw Ulam, John von Neumann and John Conway. IIt is
very impressive in its capaccity to generate complex patterns from a simple set of ruules
and conditions. This capaccity is utilized here to grow a seemingly random sharee by
specifying a password as th
he initial condition and using a CA rule to grow the share.
The specific rule chosen to carry out this task is rule 30.
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Fig. 4. Sum
mmary of the proposed visual encoding process

2.3

Rule 30

Rule 30 is one of the one-dimensional binary CA rules introduced by Stephen Wolfrram
in 1983 [40]. A cell’s sub
bsequent color is specified by the color of its immeddiate
neighbors. The rule is nam
med “Rule 30” (see Fig. 5) because the rule outcomes are
encoded in the binary representation of 30 = 000111102.

Fig. 5. Rule 30. This rule is used
u
to grow a share that acts as the key to both encryption and
decryption of an image.
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Visual Encryption via Cellular Automata

In the original visual cryptography methodology, the first share is produced randomly,
without any predefined rule or pattern. Following the typical visual cryptography
method, the second and complementary share is generated based on the original image’s pixel information and the pixel pattern in the first share. As a result, every visual
encryption needs to have both shares in order to generate the original image. Contrasting with the common visual cryptography, our proposed method uses the CA rule
30 and only one share from the original image, instead of the common method in visual
encryption where two shares are needed.
One of the many capabilities of a CA is that of generation or growth of patterns
based on a simple set of initial rules. Dr. Stephen Wolfram provides evidence that
randomness is found in the sequence generation in the time sequences that are created
from running certain CA rules [41]. This capacity of random production can be exploited in visual cryptography so we could generate a complete share, starting with no
more than a relatively small password taken from an image.
To encode an image using this method, a password would need to be generated. As
an example for proving this method, the password is predefined to be 100 bits as a
minimum size. The value of the password is extracted from the first row of pixels in
the original image. If the first row is not sufficient to generate a 100-bit password,
random bits are padded on to complete the 100 bits (but as a practical matter, this is not
restricted to that number of bits, and could be greater than that). The CA rule 30 initial
conditions are (i) the randomized first row and (ii) the initial two-color pixelized picture (see Fig. 6), with the picture’s initial width and height.

Fig. 6. Original Image: Picture= {{1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0}, {0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0}, {0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,
0},{0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0},{1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1},{1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1},{0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0,1,0},{0,0,1,0
,0,0,0,1,0,0},{0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0},{0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1}}

ECA rule 30, with a window size of 200, appears to be adequate as a random number
generator [42], passing all but one statistical test out of complete set of NIST statistical
tests for randomness [43].
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In the implementation of this methodology, the encryption and decryption process
were programmed in Wolfram Mathematica. The following pseudocode is based on the
Mathematica code that demonstrates how that was achieved starting with the original
image as shown below.
If size appropriate
Create matrix of password for CA
Create cellular automaton rule 30
Replace all values “1” for found in matrix password
Create initial conditions for cellular automaton and
extra bits
Generates cumulative sums of the elements in the list
Concatenates the two lists
Creates matrix of trimmed lists
Create cellular automaton rule 30, initial conditions
of concatenation of the two lists
Each pixel in the CA grown share is then represented by 4 pixels:
While reading the matrix of the original image
Make Share1 by replacing elements, assigning 1 to the double
size of the original image
Create new image
Afterwards, the second share can be generated using the original image’s pixel data and
the relative organization of pixels in the CA grown share, which is similar to the
original Visual Cryptography method, being able to utilize one single share (Fig. 7).

(a)

(b)

Fig. 7. (a) Generation of a random share from the CA rule 30 and initial conditions. The minimum password size = 100 bits regardless of original image size. (b) The random share with
each pixel represented by 4 alternating black and white pixels.
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Visual Decryption via Cellular Automata

The output of the encryption process is a single share (Fig. 8). The password used for
the encryption process is needed to decrypt the share and retrieve the original image.
That password along with rule 30 is used to generate the other share needed to produce
the original image. Similar to the initial stage in the encryption process, the password is
used to grow the share. That share’s pixels are then represented by four pixels each.
Finally, the original image can be retrieved by superimposing the CA grown share with
the single encrypted share. In a post-processing method, the image can be cleaned up
by just changing the color of the gray into white.

+

(a)

=

(b)

(c)

Fig. 8. Visual Decoding Process: the addition of the shares (a) and (b) reconstruction of the
original image (c)

Discussion
The original Visual Cryptography method usually relies on a one-time pad encryption
method. Two shares are generated, where one acts as a cipher while the other acts as a
key. Both the cipher and its respective key have to be present in image formats.
Moreover, each of those images is double the width and double the height of the
original image’s dimensions. The resultant size increase per image ends up at eight
times the original image’s size. This is a large size increase in addition to the inconvenience of storing two separate shares per image.
Our method solves these two issues. We only need to store a single encrypted share
and that share acts as our cipher. To decrypt the share, a visual key needs to be present.
Unlike the original method, however, the key does not have to be stored as a full share.
We only need the original 100-bit password, and from it an entire visual key can be
grown via CA Rule 30.
This method is not more convenient as a result of storing a single share rather than
two, but also more efficient. Only a single share needs to be stored, which is four times
the size of the original image and half the size required by the common method.
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Conclusion
The method described here builds on the original Visual Cryptography method presented by Naor and Shamir. It utilizes CA’s ability to generate pseudorandom patterns
from a simple starting point to grow a share from a predefined password. This approach
is both more convenient and efficient than the original Visual Cryptography approach.
A working demonstration of this research can be found in the Wolfram Demonstration
Project site [44].
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